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I. INTRODUCTION 
Being sued is bad enough when you expect it, but a surprise 
lawsuit is even worse. Suppose that you are a senior manager of a 
company that has just conducted its annual employee performance 
appraisals. Jane and Jeff, two of the employees whose appraisals 
you have just examined, are married to each other and work in the 
same office. After reading unfavorable performance reviews about 
each of them, you add their names to a potential termination list. A 
few hours after you read the reviews, however, you learn that Jeff 
has filed a Title VII lawsuit against your company alleging 
religious discrimination.1 Having a basic grasp of Title VII from 
your general counsel’s previous advice, you recognize that firing 
Jeff so shortly after learning of his discrimination claim would 
potentially expose you to additional liability.2 Despite your 
legitimate basis for terminating him, doing so could result in his 
suing your company on additional grounds, claiming that you 
terminated him in retaliation for his initial complaint.  
Perhaps you may even refrain from terminating Jane during 
this period. While you probably would not assume that firing her 
would expose your company to a retaliation claim, you may 
nevertheless feel some concern over the appearance that her 
termination would create. At the very least, you may worry that 
terminating her would heighten any tension between your company 
and Jeff resulting from his lawsuit. You may fear that as a 
consequence of Jane’s termination, the already disgruntled Jeff 
would become even more displeased with the company and 
perhaps even more aggressive with his suit. 
Now, suppose that a year later your company again completes 
performance appraisals. Upon reading a poor review of your 
employee Mark, you decide to fire him. Mark works in a different 
office than Jeff and Jane, and, as far as you know, he has no 
affiliation with either spouse. Soon after you fire Mark, though, 
you receive notice that he has filed a Title VII retaliation suit 
against your company. You are surprised to learn that he is a friend 
of Jeff. You are also shocked by Mark’s allegation that he was 
fired in retaliation for Jeff’s initial discrimination claim. Based on 
everything that you know about Title VII, you never expected to 
face a retaliation claim from a third party who engaged in no Title 
VII-protected activity himself. 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2013, by LAURA BLAIR NAQUIN. 
 1. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).  
 2. See id. § 2000e-3(a). 
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In 2011, the United States Supreme Court opened the floodgates 
for this type of unexpected claim when it allowed a third-party 
plaintiff to recover for a Title VII retaliation claim in Thompson v. 
North American Stainless, LP.3 In this case, the Court recognized a 
retaliation claim brought by the fiancé of a woman who had filed a 
prior Title VII discrimination claim.4 However, the Court refused to 
designate classes of third-party plaintiffs who may recover under 
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision, thereby exposing employers to 
unprecedented liability from an unpredictable array of potential 
plaintiffs.5 To limit its liability effectively, an employer must know 
not only which behavior may form the basis of a claim but also who 
can file it. The law after Thompson fails to provide employers with 
this basic level of certainty, though, because any third party can 
currently file a Title VII retaliation claim against his employer. 
Accordingly, employers need a standard defining which third parties 
can file these claims. 
This Comment proposes a standard for determining which third-
party plaintiffs can bring Title VII retaliation claims against their 
employers. The proposed standard is rooted in principles of tort law, 
which are appropriate both because of Title VII’s evolution into a 
statutory tort and because of the Supreme Court’s application of tort 
law principles to other employment discrimination issues.6 
Specifically, the requirements for the tort of negligent infliction of 
emotional distress (NIED), or bystander damages, may be used as a 
model for third-party retaliation claims. Claims for NIED must 
satisfy the elements of familial relationship, temporal proximity, and 
spatial proximity.7 These elements also address considerations 
pertinent to third-party Title VII retaliation claims. This Comment 
analyzes different states’ requirements for NIED claims and 
ultimately proposes a standard for determining which third-party 
plaintiffs may bring Title VII retaliation claims.  
Part I of this Comment describes the origin, evolution, and 
substance of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision. This Part also 
discusses the United States Supreme Court’s recent expansion of 
Title VII retaliation claims by broadening the definition of 
retaliation, the categories of actions deemed retaliatory, and the 
class of plaintiffs eligible to file retaliation claims. Part II discusses 
the Supreme Court’s expansion of Title VII retaliation claims to 
                                                                                                             
 3. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011). 
 4. Id. at 868. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See discussion infra Part I.A; Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 
(2011); see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (1977). 
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recognize third-party plaintiffs in its 2011 decision, Thompson v. 
North American Stainless, LP.8 Then, Part III explores Thompson’s 
ramifications and asserts the need for establishing a standard for 
third-party Title VII retaliation claims.9 Finally, Part IV proposes a 
standard rooted in principles of NIED to govern these retaliation 
claims. 
A synthesis of various states’ requirements for these claims 
forms the basis of the proposed standard for third-party Title VII 
retaliation claims. This standard examines the relationship between 
the third-party plaintiff and the coworker who engaged in the 
initial Title VII-protected activity. It also considers the elapsed 
time between the initial protected activity and the alleged 
retaliation, as well as the proximity in which the two employees 
worked. The proposed standard will balance Title VII’s policy 
goals against employers’ concerns and will ultimately satisfy both 
competing interests. 
II. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: ITS DEVELOPMENT 
AND APPLICATION 
A. Evolution of Title VII 
While Congress had considered a bill supporting civil rights 
each year between 1945 and 1957, it did not pass the first civil 
rights bill of the twentieth century until the 1957 Civil Rights Act, 
which focused on voting rights.10 The next Civil Rights Act 
followed in 1960 and expanded the rights provided by the 1957 
legislation.11 Soon afterwards, Congress enacted the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 to eradicate discrimination in both employment and 
public accommodations.12 The Act did not, however, extend to 
gender discrimination until the day before the House of 
Representatives voted on the legislation, when an opponent 
proposed an amendment to extend its protections to women.13 This 
                                                                                                             
 8. 131 S. Ct. at 868. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Major Features of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, THE DIRKSEN CONG. 
CTR., http://www.congresslink.org/printbasicshistmatscivilrights64text.htm (last 
visited October 12, 2011). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Anita G. Schausten, Retaliation Against Third Parties: A Potential 
Loophole in Title VII’s Discrimination Protection, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
1313, 1314 (2004). 
 13. Robert Stevens Miller, Jr., Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 880–81 (1967). While African 
Americans uniquely endured some forms of oppression forbidden by the Act, 
women of the era faced similar discrimination in employment. Id. 
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was an unsuccessful attempt to thwart the bill’s passage, but it 
resulted in a Civil Rights Act that protected individuals based on 
race, color, religion, national origin, and gender.14 
Since its enactment, the purpose and application of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have undergone dramatic change.15 
Congress’ goal when enacting Title VII was threefold: (1) to effect 
broad social change; (2) to boost productivity through increasing 
the country’s human capital; and (3) to repair the country’s 
international reputation, which had been blighted by persistent 
racial discrimination.16 The initial purpose of Title VII’s provision 
for attorney’s fees was to incentivize individuals’ enforcement of 
the statute.17 In effect, “the Title VII plaintiff acted ‘not for himself 
alone but also as a “private attorney general,” vindicating a policy 
that Congress considered of the highest priority.’”18 Even after 
Title VII’s 1972 amendment granted litigation authority to the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the private 
right of action continued to play an important role beyond mere 
reparation of individual damages because it furthered the public 
interest of eradicating discrimination.19 
Despite its lofty origins, Title VII has grown to resemble a 
statutory tort through the evolution of several facets of 
employment discrimination claims.20 For example, while the 
majority of early Title VII plaintiffs complained of employers’ 
widespread refusal to hire, since the 1980s, employees have more 
                                                                                                             
 14. Id. at 877. 
 15. Cheryl Krause Zemelman, The After-Acquired Evidence Defense to 
Employment of Title VII and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 175, 196 (1993). 
 16. Id. at 189; Paulette M. Caldwell, Reaffirming the Disproportionate 
Effects Standard of Liability in Title VII Litigation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 555, 
580–83 (1985); Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation As a Cold War Imperative, 41 
STAN. L. REV. 61, 62–63 (1988) (proposing that the apparent contradictions 
between American political ideology and American race relations created 
problems in foreign policy); Schausten, supra note 12; Major Features, supra 
note 10 (describing the rampant racial discrimination prior to the passage of the 
Civil Rights Acts of the late 1950s and early 1960s, elaborating that segregation 
in public facilities and schools was so pervasive throughout the South that even 
by 1963, only 12,000 of the 3,000,000 Southern African Americans attended 
integrated schools, and that racism similarly pervaded many employers’ hiring 
decisions). 
 17. Zemelman, supra note 15, at 189. 
 18. Id. at 189 (internal quotation marks omitted); Newman v. Piggie Park 
Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). 
 19. Zemelman, supra note 15, at 189–90; Alexander v. Gardner-Denver 
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974); EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 
590, 595 (1981). 
 20. Zemelman, supra note 15, at 196. 
674 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
 
 
frequently protested individual termination or promotion 
decisions.21 This transformation contributed to the sentiment that 
the statute had succeeded in reducing employment discrimination 
so that it ceased to pose a serious problem.22 Following this 
paradigm shift, the EEOC of the 1980s turned its focus from 
increasing the percentage of minorities in labor markets to 
advocating victim-specific relief.23 
Similarly, the Supreme Court changed its stance on 
employment discrimination, no longer considering it “a class based 
phenomenon with societal causes, but [instead a] series of discrete, 
aberrant acts by individuals harboring personal hostility toward the 
victim.”24 Through strengthening its support for victim-specific 
outcomes, the Court demonstrated its changed views. Early Title 
VII plaintiffs frequently filed their claims as class actions, 
conforming to the initial view that the purpose of Title VII was to 
eliminate pervasive discrimination in employment.25 However, 
class action discrimination suits began to lose favor with the Court 
in the 1970s,26 and by the 1980s individual suits comprised the 
overwhelming majority of Title VII claims.27 This shift led courts 
to examine “individuals’ private circumstances, rather than . . . 
systematic business practices” to grant individual damages.28 This 
modern practice starkly contrasts with the Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                             
 21. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of 
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 983–84 (1991). 
 22. Zemelman, supra note 15, at 194. 
 23. Id. at 196. See also Statements Before House Labor Subcommittee on 
Employment Opportunities on Use of Goals and Timetables by EEOC, 1986 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at E-1 (Mar. 12, 1986); Kenneth B. Noble, 
Anger and Elation at Ruling on Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1987, 
§ 4, at 1; Policy Changes: Aggressive Enforcement Will Mark Next Term at 
EEOC, Thomas Says, 1984 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 221, at A-6 (Nov. 15, 
1984). 
 24. Mark S. Brodin, The Role of Fault and Motive in Defining 
Discrimination: The Seniority Question Under Title VII, 62 N.C. L. REV. 943, 
945 (1984). 
 25. See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338–39 (1980) 
(restricting attorney fee awards in class actions because of the Court’s opinion 
that they promote frivolous litigation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 
U.S. 147 (1982) (requiring all members of a class, along with their 
representative, to claim injury arising from the same employment practice); E. 
Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977) (decertifying a 
class because some of its representatives had been unqualified for the positions 
that they were discriminatorily denied, even though the employer rejected them 
without examining their qualifications). 
 26. See Deposit, 445 U.S. at 338–39; see also Gen. Tel. Co., 457 U.S. at 
147; E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc., 431 U.S. at 395. 
 27. Zemelman, supra note 15, at 196. 
 28. Id.  
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original rejection of a tort model for Title VII and denial of 
compensatory damages to Title VII plaintiffs.29 
At one time, the Supreme Court denied compensatory damages 
under Title VII, considering them too unrelated to the statute’s 
mission of eliminating widespread employment discrimination.30 
Congress, however, disagreed with this position, as evidenced by 
its enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which changed the 
law to allow recovery of even punitive damages.31 Accordingly, 
the Court now embraces Title VII individual damages.32 In fact, 
the Court even acknowledges that Title VII functions as a statutory 
tort, even referring to it as such.33 Since its enactment, Title VII 
has thus, through the actions of the Supreme Court and Congress, 
transformed into a legislatively created tort in terms of its stated 
purpose and application.34 
B. Overview of Title VII 
While some aspects of Title VII have changed over the years, its 
basic goal of eliminating discrimination has remained constant. Title 
VII contains two distinct prohibitions: one against discrimination 
                                                                                                             
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. (“Title VII was ‘regarded as a mechanism to furnish relief and 
restitution to victims of a social evil, not to create a new cause of action for 
personal injuries “otherwise actionable.”’”) (quoting Whitney v. Greater N.Y. 
Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1369 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)). 
 31. Stephen A. Plass, Bedrock Principles, Elusive Construction, and the 
Future of Equal Employment Laws, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 313, 358–60 (1992). 
 32. Zemelman, supra note 15, at 196. 
 33. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (providing an 
affirmative defense to supervisor harassment claims). See also Staub v. Proctor 
Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1187 (2011) (calling USERRA (Uniformed Services 
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act) a “federal tort”); Burlington N. & 
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006) (analyzing Title VII claim 
under tort framework); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (referencing “the statutory employment ‘tort’ created 
by Title VII”), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 
(1994); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 249 (1992) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“The purposes and operation of Title VII are closely analogous to 
those of tort law . . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2006). 
 34. This Comment takes no position on whether Title VII’s transformation 
was a positive or negative change. Instead, it merely acknowledges the current 
tort-like state of the law and accordingly suggests that tort law principles serve 
as a useful and logical basis for defining a class of third-party Title VII 
retaliation plaintiffs. 
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and the other against retaliation.35 The antidiscrimination provision 
stipulates that an employer may not “fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”36 The antiretaliation provision, in 
turn, prohibits employers from  
discriminat[ing] against any of his employees or applicants 
for employment . . . because he has opposed any practice 
made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, 
or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, 
or hearing under this subchapter.37  
The Supreme Court has held that the primary purpose of the 
antiretaliation provision is to ensure the enforcement of Title VII’s 
substantive provision.38 This proposition is certainly logical—if 
employees had no remedy against their employers’ retaliation, they 
would derive no real benefit from antidiscrimination laws. Any 
remedy granted to such unprotected plaintiffs for their employers’ 
discrimination would be mitigated by employers’ unrestricted 
ability to penalize complaining employees. The Court has further 
described the purpose of the antiretaliation provision as ensuring 
“unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.”39 Beyond 
merely maintaining access to Title VII’s remedial mechanisms, 
however, the Supreme Court has actually increased the availability 
of these mechanisms in recent years by taking an increasingly 
expansive view of retaliation claims.40 
C. The Supreme Court’s Expansion of Retaliation Claims in Recent 
Years 
Employees are filing a rapidly increasing number of retaliation 
claims. Between 1997 and 2009, the percentage of Title VII 
retaliation claims rose from 20% to 31% of all claims filed with the 
                                                                                                             
 35. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 also includes a provision creating the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to govern its enforcement. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
 36. Id. 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
 38. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 57. 
 39. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997). 
 40. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
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EEOC.41 This trend correlates with the Supreme Court’s 
increasingly broad construction of Title VII’s antiretaliation 
provision. The Court justifies this liberal interpretation based on 
differences in wording between Title VII’s substantive ban on 
discrimination and its ban on retaliation.42 
1. Expansion of the Definition of Employee—Robinson v. Shell 
Oil 
The Supreme Court first expanded its protection of employees 
under Title VII in Robinson v. Shell Oil, in which it held that the 
term employee includes former employees.43 In this case, Charles 
Robinson, a former Shell Oil (Shell) employee, initially filed an 
EEOC charge claiming that Shell had fired him in violation of Title 
VII.44 Subsequently, Mr. Robinson applied for a position with 
another company, to which Shell gave a negative reference.45 Mr. 
Robinson proceeded to file a retaliation claim against Shell, alleging 
that the company had provided the negative reference in retaliation 
for his initial complaint.46 He prevailed on this retaliation claim 
because the Supreme Court held that the term employee in Title 
VII’s antiretaliation provision encompassed both current and former 
employees.47 In so holding, the Court departed from prior 
                                                                                                             
 41. Charge Statistics, FY 1997 Through FY 2009, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ 
charges.cfm (last visited Aug. 18, 2011). 
 42. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 62–63. Compare 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (prohibiting an employer from “fail[ing] or 
refus[ing] to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise . . . 
discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment” or “limit[ing], segregat[ing], or 
classify[ing] his employees or applicants for employment in any way which 
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee” based on a protected 
characteristic), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (prohibiting an employer 
from “discriminat[ing] against any of his employees or applicants for 
employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, 
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, 
or hearing under this subchapter”) (emphasis added). See also Susan M. Omilian 
& Jean P. Kamp, SEX-BASED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 12.06 (1990). 
 43. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 337. 
 44. Id. at 339. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 340. 
 47. Id. at 346. 
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jurisprudence, which had only included current employees within 
the scope of the provision.48  
2. Expansion of the Definition of Discrimination—Burlington 
Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White 
After broadening the definition of employee under Title VII’s 
antiretaliation provision, the Supreme Court turned to another 
element of these claims, namely, discrimination. The circuits were 
split over the term’s definition prior to the Supreme Court’s 
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White decision.49 The 
Fifth and Eighth Circuits applied the most restrictive standard to 
the term—the “ultimate employment decision” standard.50 This 
standard considered retaliatory conduct to constitute discrimination 
under Title VII’s antiretaliation provision only when it rose to the 
level of decisions “such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, 
promoting, and compensating.”51 Other circuits, including the 
Sixth, instead applied the same definition of discrimination for 
retaliation claims that they applied to the underlying discrimination 
claims.52 This more expansive standard only required plaintiffs to 
show that the employer’s retaliatory action caused “an adverse 
effect on the ‘terms, conditions, or benefits’ of employment.”53 
Because of the conflicting approaches, the Supreme Court 
stepped in to resolve the circuit split. In Burlington Northern, the 
Supreme Court defined discrimination under Title VII’s 
antiretaliation provision to include “any adverse treatment that is 
based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the 
charging party or others from engaging in protected activity.”54 
This definition of discrimination encompasses an even broader 
range of activities than those covered under Title VII’s substantive 
                                                                                                             
 48. Id. 
 49. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).  
 50. Id. at 60 (quoting Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 
2001)). 
 51. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 60 (quoting Mattern v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
 52. Id. at 60. 
 53. Id. at 60–61 (quoting Von Gunten, 243 F. 3d at 866). 
 54. Id. at 66 (quoting EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8-13 (1998)) 
[hereinafter EEOC MANUAL], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy 
/docs/retal.pdf). See also EEOC INTERPRETIVE MANUAL, REFERENCE MANUAL 
TO TITLE VII LAW FOR COMPLIANCE PERSONNEL § 491.2 (1972) (Section 704(a) 
“is intended to provide ‘exceptionally broad protection’ for protestors of 
discriminatory employment practices.”). 
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antidiscrimination provision.55 So, the Burlington Northern 
definition reaches further than even the more expansive of the two 
interpretations previously followed by the circuits.56 Under the 
Burlington standard, therefore, employer activities that do not 
constitute discrimination under Title VII’s substantive provision 
may nonetheless constitute discrimination under the antiretaliation 
provision.57 
III. THE CREATION OF THIRD-PARTY STANDING FOR TITLE VII 
RETALIATION CLAIMS 
The next logical step after the Supreme Court’s expansion of 
the definitions of employee and discrimination under Title VII’s 
antiretaliation provision was the expansion of the class of plaintiffs 
who may file retaliation claims. Prior to Thompson, the circuits 
were split over the proper standard for analyzing third-party 
retaliation claims under Title VII.58 Some circuits rejected these 
claims altogether, instead adhering to the plain language of Title 
VII, which does not specifically provide for third-party plaintiffs.59 
Others recognized third-party retaliation claims, considering them 
supported by the legislative intent underlying Title VII.60 In 
                                                                                                             
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (“It shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way 
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”). 
 56. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 60–61. 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (“It shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or 
applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an 
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a 
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” (emphasis added)). The Supreme 
Court held that Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company unlawfully 
retaliated against Sheila White for her previously filed discrimination complaint 
against the company by suspending her without pay and reassigning her duties. 
Burlington, 548 U.S. at 73. Though Burlington reassigned White to perform 
tasks that were within her job description, the Court determined that the change 
in duties was “materially adverse” because the new duties were less desirable 
than her former ones. Id. 
 58. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 808–11 (6th 
Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011). 
 59. See discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
 60. See discussion infra Part II.A.1. 
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accordance with its previous expansion of retaliation claims, the 
Supreme Court ultimately adopted the latter approach in 
Thompson.61 It reasoned that withholding the cause of action from 
third parties would constitute an “artificially narrow reading” of 
Title VII and thus permitted third-party Title VII retaliation 
claims.62 
A. Third-Party Retaliation Claims—The Pre-Thompson Circuit 
Split 
Third-party retaliation claims differ markedly from traditional 
retaliation claims. A traditional plaintiff seeking redress under 
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision establishes a prima facie case 
by demonstrating that (1) he took part in an activity protected by 
Title VII; (2) his employer committed an adverse employment 
action against him; and (3) his protected activity motivated the 
employer’s adverse employment action.63 A third-party retaliation 
claim, in contrast, arises when one employee engages in Title VII-
protected activity, but the employer retaliates against a different 
employee, who then files suit.64 While the Supreme Court had 
previously established that Title VII protects third parties who 
engage in protected behavior on behalf of their coworkers, “pure” 
third-party plaintiffs fall short of this criteria.65 These plaintiffs 
necessarily fail to meet the first prong of a retaliation claim—
participation in a protected activity—because a third-party plaintiff 
did not previously engage in protected activity.66 
Because third-party plaintiffs do not fit the conventional 
criteria for Title VII retaliation claims, different circuit courts took 
different approaches when determining whether to allow third-
                                                                                                             
 61. See discussion infra Part II.A.1. 
 62. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870. 
 63. Stevens v. St. Louis Univ. Med. Ctr., 97 F.3d 268, 270 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 64. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 520 F.3d 644, 647 (6th Cir. 
2008), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011). 
 65. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 
555 U.S. 271 (2009) (extending Title VII protection from retaliation to 
employees who oppose discrimination on behalf of coworkers in certain 
circumstances). When discussing third-party Title VII retaliation plaintiffs, this 
Comment refers to these “pure” third-party plaintiffs who have personally 
engaged in no protected activity. 
 66. Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third 
Parties and the Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 
933–34 (2007). 
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party retaliation claims.67 Prior to the Supreme Court’s grant of 
certiorari in Thompson, the circuit courts had applied two main 
standards to these claims, either adhering to the plain language of 
Title VII or adopting a more expansive approach, such as 
interpreting it purposively.68 
1. Purposive Interpretation of Title VII  
Some circuits, espousing a purposive approach, liberally 
construed Title VII. These circuits allowed third-party retaliation 
claims because they deemed the claims to further Title VII’s 
purpose of providing “‘unfettered access’ to [the statute’s] 
remedial mechanisms.”69 The Eleventh Circuit and, initially, the 
Sixth Circuit utilized a purposive approach and allowed third-party 
Title VII retaliation claims.70 Some district courts and the EEOC 
subscribed to this philosophy as well.71 
The Eleventh Circuit in Wu v. Thomas, for instance, recognized 
a husband’s claim for retaliation under Title VII even though he 
had not personally engaged in activity protected by Title VII.72 The 
court decided that he could sue under Title VII’s antiretaliation 
provision because his wife, and coworker, had previously filed a 
                                                                                                             
 67. John J. Feeney, An Inevitable Progression in the Scope of Title VII’s 
Antiretaliation Provision: Third-Party Retaliation Claims, 38 CAP. U.L. REV. 
643, 652–55 (2010). 
 68. Id. In addition to cases specifically addressing the antiretaliation 
provision of Title VII, this Comment refers to cases interpreting the 
antiretaliation provisions of the ADA and ADEA for additional guidance on the 
interpretation of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision. See Schausten, supra note 
12, at 1322–23 (“Because cases under Title VII, the Americans with Disability 
Act (‘ADA’) [42 U.S.C. §12206], and Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(‘ADEA’) [29 U.S.C. §623(d)] all tend to be analyzed similarly in relation to 
retaliation, courts use cases from all three statutes as precedent in making their 
decisions.”); see also Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567 (3d Cir. 
2002) (“[P]recedent interpreting any one of these statutes is equally relevant to 
interpretation of the others.”). 
 69. Angela J. Schnell, But I Love Him! Why the Sixth Circuit Erred in 
Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP by Denying a Third Party 
Retaliation Claim Under Title VII, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 909, 
919 (2010). 
 70. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 520 F.3d 644, 647 (6th Cir. 
2008), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011). 
 71. Murphy v. Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1108 
(W.D.N.Y. 1996); Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1989); DeMedina v. 
Reinhardt, 444 F. Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1978); EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 
F. Supp. 2d 1206 (E.D. Cal. 1998); Thomas v. Am. Horse Shows Assoc., Inc., 
No. 97-CV-3513 JG, 1999 WL 287721 (E.D.N.Y. April 23, 1999); EEOC 
MANUAL § 8-10, supra note 54. 
 72. Wu, 863 F.2d at 1547–48. 
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Title VII discrimination claim.73 Even though the husband was a 
third party, the court recognized his claim because the employer’s 
retaliatory action impacted his wife, the initial Title VII claimant.74 
Similarly, a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit initially 
applied a purposive approach to Title VII retaliation claims in 
Thompson.75 The court determined that the purpose of Title VII 
supports third-party retaliation claims.76 It held that “Title VII 
prohibit[s] employers from taking retaliatory action against 
employees not directly involved in protected activity, but who are so 
closely related to or associated with those who are directly involved, 
that it is clear that the protected activity motivated the employer’s 
action” because “such conduct would undermine the purposes of 
Title VII.”77 The court additionally noted that a literal reading of 
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision runs contrary to the intent of 
Title VII.78 It concluded that, under the Burlington standard, an 
employer’s retaliation against a family member would discourage 
“reasonable workers” from filing discrimination claims.79 
Like the Eleventh and Sixth Circuits, several district courts 
have allowed spouses to file third-party retaliation claims.80 A few 
district courts have even extended these claims to siblings.81 The 
EEOC also supports third-party retaliation claims, considering 
them to be covered by Title VII’s prohibition against “retaliation 
against someone so closely related to or associated with the person 
exercising his or her statutory rights that it would discourage that 
person from pursuing those rights.”82 
2. Literal Interpretation of Title VII  
Instead of following a purposive approach, the Eighth, Third, 
Fifth, and, eventually, Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals interpreted 
                                                                                                             
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1548. 
 75. Thompson, 520 F.3d at 647. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 646. 
 78. Id. at 647. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Murphy v. Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1108 
(W.D.N.Y. 1996); Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1989); DeMedina v. 
Reinhardt, 444 F. Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1978).  
 81. EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (E.D. Cal. 1998); 
Thomas v. Am. Horse Shows Assoc., Inc., No. 97-CV-3513 JG, 1999 WL 
287721 (E.D.N.Y. April 23, 1999). 
 82. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 54, at § 8-10. 
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Title VII’s antiretaliation provision literally.83 These circuits 
reached the conclusion that third-party retaliation claims were 
invalid because the express language of Title VII does not provide 
for them.84 As an additional rationale for prohibiting these claims, 
the Third Circuit cites the potentially limitless liability to which 
third-party retaliation claims would subject employers.85 
The Eighth Circuit, in Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., refused to 
recognize third-party retaliation claims, holding steadfastly that 
only the person who took part in the initial protected activity may 
file a Title VII retaliation claim.86 In Riceland, an employee who 
lived with a coworker filed discrimination charges against her 
employer, which later fired the coworker.87 The coworker, in turn, 
filed suit under Title VII’s antiretaliation provision; however, the 
Eighth Circuit held that he did not have a valid claim because he 
had not engaged in any protected activity himself.88  
The Third Circuit likewise rejected third-party retaliation 
claims in Fogleman v. Mercy Hospital, Inc.89 The court 
acknowledged that Title VII’s purpose could potentially support 
the recognition of third-party retaliation claims.90 However, 
because it did not find “that adherence to the statute’s plain text 
would be absurd,” it determined that the plain language of the 
statute should control.91 Using similar logic, the Fifth Circuit 
rejected third-party retaliation claims in Holt v. JTM Industries.92 
The court 
recognize[d] that there is a possible risk that an employer 
will discriminate against a complaining employee’s relative 
or friend in retaliation for the complaining employee’s 
                                                                                                             
 83. Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 1998); Fogleman 
v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 569 (3d Cir. 2002); Holt v. JTM Indus., 89 
F.3d 1224, 1227 (5th Cir. 1996) (addressing retaliation under the ADEA); 
Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 816 (6th Cir. 2009), 
rev’d 131 S. Ct. 836 (2011). 
 84. Feeney, supra note 67, at 665–66. See also Thompson, 567 F.3d at 808; 
Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 570; Holt, 89 F.3d at 1226; Smith, 151 F.3d at 819. 
 85. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 570. 
 86. Smith, 151 F.3d at 813. 
 87. Id. at 815–16. 
 88. Id. at 813. 
 89. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 571. 
 90. Id. at 569. 
 91. Id. at 570. 
 92. Holt v. JTM Indus., 89 F.3d 1224, 1227 (5th Cir. 1996) (addressing 
retaliation under the ADEA). But see Jones v. Flagship Int’l, 793 F.2d 714, 727 
(5th Cir. 1986) (commenting that “employee opposition to discriminatory 
employment practices directed against a fellow employee” could be considered 
protected activity under Title VII’s antiretaliation provision). 
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actions . . . [but] . . . believe[d] that the language that 
Congress has employed . . . will better protect employees 
against retaliation than [the court] could by trying to define 
the types of relationships that should render automatic 
standing [for third parties].93 
Finally, after briefly recognizing third-party retaliation claims, 
the Sixth Circuit reversed its position.94 Upon its rehearing en banc 
of Thompson, the court vacated its original decision and affirmed 
the district court’s holding “that § 704(a) of Title VII does not 
create a cause of action for third-party retaliation for persons who 
have not personally engaged in protected activity.”95 The Sixth 
Circuit based its decision on the established principle that “[w]hen 
the statutory language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at 
least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to 
enforce it according to its terms.”96 The court determined that the 
antiretaliation provision’s plain wording limits the class of 
antiretaliation plaintiffs to individuals who have personally 
engaged in protected activities, a result that it did not consider 
absurd.97 Because Thompson had not engaged in any protected 
activity, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly 
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant corporation.98 
B. Thompson v. North American Stainless—The Recognition of 
Third-Party Standing in Title VII Retaliation Claims 
Relying on its Burlington Northern definition of discrimination, 
the Supreme Court continued its expansion of Title VII’s protections 
by allowing third-party retaliation claims in Thompson.99 Eric 
Thompson and his then-fiancée Miriam Regalado both worked for 
North American Stainless until 2003. That year, the corporation 
fired Thompson three weeks after receiving notice that Regalado 
had filed a Title VII discrimination claim against their employer.100 
Subsequently, Thompson filed a Title VII retaliation claim against 
North American Stainless, alleging that his termination was 
                                                                                                             
 93. Holt, 89 F.3d at 1227. 
 94. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 816 (6th Cir. 
2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 807 (quoting Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 
291 (2006)).  
 97. Thompson, 567 F.3d at 805. 
 98. Id. at 805–06. 
 99. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006); 
Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 868 (2011). 
 100. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 867. 
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retaliation for Regalado’s discrimination charge.101 The district court 
dismissed Thompson’s retaliation claim on summary judgment, 
reasoning that Title VII “does not permit third party retaliation 
claims.”102 The Sixth Circuit initially reversed the district court,103 
but on rehearing en banc the court vacated its previous decision.104 
The court ultimately affirmed the district court’s decision granting 
summary judgment to North American Stainless.105 In a unanimous 
decision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that 
third parties may, in fact, file suit under Title VII’s antiretaliation 
provision even when they do not engage in any protected activity.106  
The Supreme Court first examined whether North American’s 
alleged retaliation against Thompson violated Title VII.107 It 
answered this question in the affirmative, citing Burlington for the 
proposition that the statute’s antiretaliation provision encompasses 
a wide range of employer conduct.108 The Court explained that 
Title VII “prohibits any employer action that well might have 
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge 
of discrimination.”109 Further, the Court reasoned that a reasonable 
worker may be discouraged from engaging in protected activity if 
he knew that his fiancée would be fired as a result.110 The Supreme 
Court declined to define a category of third parties against whom 
retaliation would be unlawful.111 Instead, it surmised that “firing a 
close family member” would “almost always” be unlawful, while 
“inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere acquaintance . . . almost 
never” would.112 The Court stated that the circumstances of each 
case must determine whether retaliation against a third party 
constituted a Title VII violation.113 It did, however, emphasize that 
an objective determination of injury is necessary to “avoi[d] the 
                                                                                                             
 101. Id. 
 102. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 435 F. Supp. 2d 633, 639 
(E.D. Ky. 2006), rev’d, 520 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 103. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 520 F.3d 644, 647 (6th Cir. 
2008), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011). See discussion supra Part I.D.2 
 104. Thompson, v. North American Stainless, LP, No. 07-5040, 2008 WL 
6191996 (6th Cir. Jul. 28, 2008). See discussion supra Part I.D.2 
 105. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 805–06 (6th 
Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011). 
 106. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011). 
 107. Id. at 867–68. 
 108. Id.; Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 53 (2006). 
 109. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co., 548 U.S. at 68) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 868–69 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 
68–69). 
686 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
 
 
uncertainties and unfair discrepancies that can plague a judicial 
effort to determine a plaintiff’s unusual subjective feelings.”114 
In its analysis of third-party standing for Title VII retaliation 
claims, the Supreme Court admitted that person[s] aggrieved who 
may sue under the statute must encompass a narrower class than 
mere Article III standing.115 The term excludes plaintiffs “who 
might technically be injured in an Article III sense but whose 
interests are unrelated to Title VII’s statutory prohibitions.”116 On 
the other hand, the Court advised that limiting person aggrieved to 
the initial participant in Title VII-protected activity is an artificially 
narrow reading.117 Between the two extremes, the Court offered 
the standard applied by the Administrative Procedure Act,118 
allowing any “person . . . adversely affected or aggrieved . . . 
within the meaning of a relevant statute” to sue a federal agency.119 
The Court reasoned that this language allows a plaintiff to sue if 
his claim falls within the “zone of interests” protected by the 
statute, the violation of which gives rise to the complaint.120 The 
Supreme Court noted that Title VII is intended to protect 
employees from their employers’ illegal actions.121 Because 
Thompson suffered from his employer’s illegal retaliation, the 
Court explained, he fell within the zone of interests protected by 
Title VII. It therefore concluded that Thompson had standing for 
his Title VII retaliation claim.122 
IV. PROPOSED STANDARD FOR THIRD-PARTY STANDING IN TITLE 
VII RETALIATION CLAIMS 
The Supreme Court decided Thompson in accordance with 
scholars’ predictions that the Court would continue its recent trend 
of broadening Title VII retaliation claims.123 This jurisprudential 
expansion follows the notion that third-party retaliation claims 
should be permitted because their prohibition would limit 
employees’ access to Title VII due to the fear of reprisal.124 In fact, 
                                                                                                             
 114. Id. at 868–69 (citation omitted). 
 115. Id. at 869. 
 116. Id. at 870. 
 117. Id. at 869–70. 
 118. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). 
 119. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702). 
 120. Id. See also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883, n.110 
(1990) (proposing zone of interests test for plaintiffs suing under federal 
statutes). 
 121. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 869–70. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Feeney, supra note 67, at 652–55. 
 124. Schnell, supra note 69, at 921. 
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the decision “closes a loophole some courts—and employers—had 
found in Title VII’s antiretaliation provision.”125 The Court’s 
liberalization of retaliation claims also represents a welcome step 
for those who argued in favor of further expansion of Title VII 
retaliation claims.126 Finally, it satisfies those who support 
retaliation claims because they maintain the “integrity of the rule 
of law” and should thus be broadly construed to provide greater 
protection.127 
In broadening Title VII retaliation claims, the Thompson Court 
rejected the defendant corporation’s argument that allowing third 
parties who engaged in no protected activity to file Title VII 
retaliation claims would “place the employer at risk any time it 
fires any employee who happens to have a connection to a 
different employee who filed a charge with the EEOC.”128 The 
Court dismissed this position, stating that an employer’s desire for 
predictability did not justify the preclusion of all third-party 
reprisals.129 Employers’ concern about unexpected plaintiffs may 
not merit a blanket prohibition on all third-party retaliation claims, 
but there is no reason to preclude a standard governing these 
claims. On the contrary, such guidelines are necessary for the 
limitation of the otherwise infinite range of third-party plaintiffs. 
A. The Need for a Standard Governing Third-Party Standing in 
Title VII Retaliation Claims 
Presently, any employee who has had any contact with a 
coworker who has engaged in Title VII-protected activity may 
bring a Title VII retaliation claim.130 The absence of a standard 
governing these claims leaves employers vulnerable to lawsuits 
from any number of unforeseen plaintiffs.131 This development, 
coupled with the recent increase in Title VII retaliation claims, 
could cause employers to incur substantial legal fees defending 
                                                                                                             
 125. David L. Hudson, Jr., Back at Ya: Employee Retaliation Claims Play 
Big Before the High Court, 97 A.B.A. J. 21, 21 (2011) (quoting Lawrence 
Rosenthal, professor of employment discrimination law at Northern Kentucky 
University’s Salmon P. Chase College of Law). 
 126. Id. 
 127. R. George Wright, Retaliation and the Rule of Law in Today’s 
Workplace, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 749, 749–57 (2011). 
 128. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 868 (2011). 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. (“Firing a close family member” would “almost always” be 
unlawful, while “inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere acquaintance” would 
“almost never” be.). 
 131. Id. 
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baseless allegations that they could never have anticipated.132 
Some scholars suggest that merely requiring “the third party to 
meet all of the normal requirements of a retaliation claim” would 
eliminate the potential for abuse through frivolous lawsuits.133 
However, the merits of retaliation claims are often indeterminable 
upon a preliminary showing.134 Because these claims frequently 
entail analysis of suspect timing and witness credibility, judges 
often leave these factual determinations to juries.135 Even if such a 
claim is unfounded, the employer may nevertheless expend 
considerable resources before it is dismissed. While employers 
may, of course, have to defend themselves against some baseless 
claims in any area of the law, the potential number of meritless 
third-party retaliation claims is staggering after Thompson.136 Now 
any employee has standing to sue for retaliation based on any 
coworker’s Title VII-protected activity. For a large corporation, 
that translates into a myriad of potential retaliation claims. 
Employers need to be able to make employment decisions, 
including those to take adverse actions against employees. If the 
risk of retaliation suits is too nebulous, it may alter employer’s 
decisions, impairing the business’s daily operations. Therefore, 
employers need a standard for determining third parties’ standing 
in Title VII retaliation claims. 
B. Rationale for Applying Tort Standard 
Over the years, Title VII has evolved from a “private attorney 
general” mechanism into, essentially, a statutory tort.137 
Accordingly, tort law principles provide an appropriate source for 
a standard governing third-party Title VII retaliation claims. 
Recently, the Supreme Court borrowed from tort law to devise a 
standard for employment discrimination claims in Staub v. Proctor 
                                                                                                             
 132. Charge Statistics, supra note 41. 
 133. Feeney, supra note 67, at 669–70 (A plaintiff meeting the “normal 
requirements” of a retaliation claim must show that he engaged in Title VII-
protected activity and that his employer consequently retaliated against him.). 
 134. See Gregory P. Kult, Retaliation Claims Take Center Stage, 
EMPLOYMENT LAW IN BRIEF, 2 (May 31, 2011), http://www.martindale.com 
/members/ArticleAtachment.aspx?od=814019&id=1291842&filename=asr-129 
1846.docx.pdf. 
 135. The term suspect timing refers to “close timing between an employee’s 
protected activity and an adverse employment action.” See Shackelford v. 
DeLoitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 408 (5th Cir. 1999) (describing suspect 
timing); see also Kult, supra note 134, at 2. 
 136. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 868 (2011). 
 137. Zemelman, supra note 15, at 189; Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 
U.S. 400, 402 (1968). See also discussion supra Part I.A. 
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Hospital.138 This cat’s-paw discrimination case involved an alleged 
violation of The Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), a federal statute that 
closely resembles Title VII.139 The Court initially noted that when 
examining federal torts, it applies general tort law principles.140 
Thus, it determined that the tort theory of proximate cause was the 
appropriate standard for determining employers’ liability in cat’s-
paw discrimination cases.141 Proximate cause “requires only ‘some 
direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious 
conduct alleged,’ and excludes only those ‘link[s] that are too 
remote, purely contingent, or indirect.’”142 So, an employer is 
liable under USERRA if (1) a supervisor is motivated by 
antimilitary sentiment; (2) that supervisor takes an adverse 
employment action; and (3) the antimilitary sentiment proximately 
caused the action.143 
The Staub Court’s proclaimation that “when Congress creates a 
federal tort it adopts the background of general tort law” applies 
                                                                                                             
 138. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (U.S. 2011).  
 139. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 
1186 (2011) (This case addressed a cat’s-paw discrimination claim. This type of 
claim arises when an employee’s supervisor, acting with a discriminatory 
motivation, instigates the employer, who may have had no discriminatory 
feelings toward the employee, to terminate or implement an adverse 
employment decision against the employee. A lack of any discriminatory 
sentiments on the part of the employer is irrelevant; instead, the discriminatory 
motive of the supervisor, who himself lacks the authority to terminate or 
adversely affect the employee’s terms of employment, is imputed to the 
employer. The term cat’s paw comes from the fable “The Monkey and the Cat,” 
written by the 17th century French poet Jean de La Fontaine, which references a 
monkey manipulating a cat to fulfill the monkey’s goal.). See also Staub, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1191 (“A person who is a member of . . . or has an obligation to perform 
service in a uniformed service shall not be denied initial employment, 
reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of 
employment by an employer on the basis of that membership . . . or 
obligation.”). Compare 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a) (2006) (USERRA provides that “an 
employer shall be considered to have engaged in actions prohibited . . . under 
subsection (a), if the person’s membership . . . is a motivating factor in the 
employer’s action, unless the employer can prove that the action would have 
been taken in the absence of such membership.”), with 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 
(m) (2006) (Title VII prohibits discrimination “because of . . . race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin” and provides that discrimination occurs when 
one of these factors “was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even 
though other factors also motivated the practice.”). 
 140. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1191.  
 141. Id. at 1193.  
 142. Id. at 1192 (quoting Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 130 S. Ct. 
983, 989 (2010)). 
 143. Id. at 1194. 
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equally to Title VII as to USERRA.144 Because Title VII has 
become increasingly tort-like through the actions of Congress and 
the Supreme Court, the Court should analogize to general tort law 
for Title VII claims.145 The Court in Staub sought to determine a 
party’s liability for an injury caused by more than one actor—
precisely the type of situation in which a proximate cause 
determination is applied in tort law. Similarly, third-party standing 
for Title VII retaliation claims hinges on whether a particular 
plaintiff may sue for an injury inflicted on someone else.146 This 
potential plaintiff is not the intended subject of retaliation; he 
merely incurs the collateral damage of the employer’s intended 
retaliation against a coworker.147  
Like a third-party retaliation plaintiff, an NIED plaintiff, by 
definition, suffers no physical damage from the incident that 
causes injury but sustains only secondary effects of the occurrence. 
Therefore, the bystander-damages standard serves as an 
appropriate model for the third-party plaintiff’s standard. It 
accomplishes the same objective as a standard for third-party 
standing in a Title VII retaliation claim. Courts developed the 
NIED standard because they “have realized that recognition of a 
cause of action for [NIED] holds out the very real possibility of 
nearly infinite and unpredictable liability for defendants.”148 
Similar reasons necessitate a standard for third-party standing in 
Title VII retaliation claims. Without such a standard, employers 
are subject to an immeasurable number of Title VII retaliation 
claims and have no ability to predict which classes of plaintiffs 
may file them. Employers, therefore, need a standard determining 
third-party standing for Title VII retaliation claims, and principles 
of NIED make it an appropriate source from which to extract this 
standard because of their applicability to third-party retaliation 
claims. 
                                                                                                             
 144. Id. at 1191. 
 145. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 146. Admittedly, NIED is a standard governing claims of negligence; 
whereas, Title VII retaliation claims result from intentional behavior. However, 
this difference does not affect the applicability of the NIED to Title VII 
retaliation claims because the proposed standard merely addresses standing. 
Further judicial proceedings, therefore, entail the factual determination of the 
claim’s underlying merits, including the defendant’s fault. This standard, in 
contrast, only governs the eligibility of plaintiffs to file claims.  
 147. In a third-party retaliation claim, the employer intends to retaliate 
against the employee who initially engaged in the protected action by taking 
action to harm the third party. 
 148. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 546 (1994). 
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C. Tort Standard for NIED Claims and Its Application to Third-
Party Title VII Retaliation Plaintiffs 
The United States Supreme Court assessed claims for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress under the Federal Employers’ 
Liability Act in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall.149 The Court 
commented that “most States recognize a common-law cause of 
action for [NIED], but limit recovery to certain classes of plaintiffs 
or categories of claims through the application of one or more 
tests.”150 The Court described three tests for bystander-damage 
claims that the states apply: (1) the physical impact test; (2) the 
zone of danger test; and (3) the relative bystander test.151 Most 
states have abandoned the once prevalent physical impact test in 
favor of the zone of danger test or the relative bystander test. 
While the zone of danger test emerged in 1908 and remains the law 
in several states, a plurality of states now follows the relative 
bystander test first articulated in 1968.152 
The relative bystander test for NIED claims originated with the 
1968 California case Dillon v. Legg, in which a plaintiff recovered 
for emotional distress after observing the death of her daughter.153 
In Dillon, the California Supreme Court established that a 
defendant would be liable for bystander damages to a plaintiff (1) 
who was at the location of the incident when it occurred; (2) who 
was closely related to the victim; and (3) whose emotional distress 
was caused by his contemporaneous observation of the accident.154 
                                                                                                             
 149. Id. at 537. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. (The physical impact test requires a plaintiff claiming NIED to have 
contemporaneously suffered a physical impact or injury because of the 
defendant’s negligence.); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (A plaintiff 
seeking damages for NIED under the zone of danger test, must have been in 
sufficiently close proximity to the negligent actor to have a reasonable fear for 
his own safety to result in a physical injury arising from his emotional distress.).  
 152. Consol. Rail, 512 U.S. at 547.  
 153. Dillon, 441 P.2d 912. 
 154. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (1977) (providing 
that a plaintiff may recover against a negligent actor when the plaintiff suffers a 
physical injury as a result of his emotional distress, which was prompted by the 
actor’s negligent infliction of harm or peril on a member of the plaintiff’s 
immediate family in the plaintiff’s presence). Illustration 3 in the relevant 
Restatement section explains this point as follows: 
A negligently leaves a truck insecurely parked at the top of a hill. 
Because of this negligence the truck starts down the hill. B and C, her 
child, are in the street in the path of the truck. The truck swerves, 
misses B, and strikes C. B, who is watching C, does not see the truck 
coming, and is not alarmed for her own safety, but suffers severe shock 
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These three Dillon factors neatly apply to third-party Title VII 
retaliation claims because retaliation claims likewise entail spatial, 
relational, and temporal analyses.155 Thus, a third party who fulfills 
spatial, relational, and temporal requirements derived from those 
applied to NIED claims should have standing to file Title VII 
retaliation claims. Finally, the prevalence and relative modernity of 
the Dillon test156 support the use of its elements as a basis for a 
standard for third-party retaliation claims. 
1. Relational Requirement 
The Dillon test provides that a plaintiff may only recover 
against a defendant whose negligence caused harm or danger to the 
plaintiff’s immediate family member.157 This NIED requirement 
limits the tortfeasor’s otherwise indefinite liability.158 Similarly, a 
relational requirement for third-party retaliation plaintiffs would 
ameliorate employers’ current plight of unpredictable liability. The 
Thompson Court’s statement that “firing a close family member” 
would “almost always” be unlawful, while “inflicting a milder 
reprisal on a mere acquaintance” would “almost never” be 
unlawful further supports this element’s application to third-party 
retaliation plaintiffs.159 Because of the close relationship that 
family members can be presumed to share, an employer would 
likely assume that an employee will be most significantly affected 
by retaliation targeting his family members, rather than other 
coworkers. Thus, family members are the most likely third parties 
to suffer retaliation. Similarly, because of family members’ close 
relationships, a family member is more likely than any other 
bystander to suffer severe emotional distress at observing a victim 
sustain an injury. It is therefore logical and appropriate to apply the 
standard of familial relationship utilized in bystander-damage 
claims to third-party retaliation plaintiffs.  
Because NIED is a state law claim, the familial relationship 
that must exist between the bystander and the actual victim varies 
from state to state.160 While Dillon created the tort and laid out its 
                                                                                                             
 
and resulting serious illness at the sight of the injury to C. A is subject 
to liability to B for the shock and her illness. 
Id. at. illus. 3. 
 155. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920. 
 156. Consol. Rail, 512 U.S. at 548–49. 
 157. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920. 
 158. Consol. Rail, 512 U.S. at 546. 
 159. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 868 (2011). 
 160. See discussion infra Part IV.C.1(a–c). 
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basic elements,161 its ambiguity as to the required relationship has 
prompted most states to define precisely which relationships 
qualify.162 For example, when Louisiana first adopted a cause of 
action for bystander damages in Lejeune v. Rayne Hospital, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court failed to specify a class of potential 
plaintiffs,163 as did the United States Supreme Court in 
Thompson.164 With language similar to that included in 
Thompson,165 the Lejeune court chose to “leave for another day a 
decision whether recovery should be allowed only for close 
relatives (and if so, which ones), or rather, for those with simply a 
close relationship to the victim.”166 Shortly after this decision, the 
Louisiana Legislature enacted Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.6, 
which specified the particular relationships that would qualify for 
bystander damages. 
a. Blood Relatives within the Second Degree of Consanguinity 
New York and Michigan apply the strictest standard to the 
relationship requirement of bystander-damage claims, allowing 
spouses, children, and parents to recover, while barring more 
distant relatives from recovery.167 In addition to plaintiffs in these 
classes, Iowa, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Wisconsin also allow 
siblings, grandparents, and grandchildren to recover.168 
                                                                                                             
 161. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 912. Prior to this case, plaintiffs could only recover 
for bystander damages when they were within the “zone of danger,” meaning 
that they were in sufficiently close proximity to the negligent actor to have a 
reasonable fear for their own safety to result in a physical injury arising from 
their emotional distress. 
 162. See Dale J. Gilsinger, Relationship Between Victim and Plaintiff-
Witness As Affecting Right to Recover Under State Law for Negligent Infliction 
of Emotional Distress Due to Witnessing Injury to Another Where Bystander 
Plaintiff Is Not Member of Victim’s Immediate Family, 98 A.L.R. 5TH 609 
(2002). 
 163. Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559, 570–71 (La. 1990). 
 164. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 868 (2011). 
 165. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868. 
 166. Lejeune, 556 So. 2d at 570–71. 
 167. Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843, 849–50 (N.Y. 1984); Trombetta v. 
Conkling, 593 N.Y.S.2d 670, 671 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (denying bystander 
damages to victim’s aunt), aff'd, 626 N.E.2d 653 (N.Y. 1993). See also Blanyar 
v. Pagnotti Enters., Inc., 679 A.2d 790, 793–94 (Pa. 1996), aff'd, 710 A.2d 608 
(1998) (suggesting that Pennsylvania may apply New York’s relationship 
standard in claims of NIED); Gustafson v. Faris, 241 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1976); Nugent v. Bauermeister, 489 N.W.2d 148, 150 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1992); Maldonado v. Nat’l Acme Co., 73 F.3d 642, 645 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 168. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.6 (2012); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 
108 (Iowa 1981); Fernandez v. Walgreen Hastings Co., 968 P.2d 774, 781 
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b. Relatives of Varying Degrees of Consanguinity 
In addition to spouses, parents, siblings, children, and 
grandparents, California and Texas permit NIED recovery by other 
relatives as long as they live in the same household as the 
victim.169 Nebraska specifically includes aunts and uncles, with no 
requirement of residency, but cautions that they, along with 
grandparents, shoulder “a heavier burden of proving a significant 
attachment” to the victim.170 Alaska,171 Arizona,172 Connecticut,173 
Florida,174 Indiana,175 Maine,176 Nebraska,177 Nevada,178 and West 
                                                                                                             
 
(N.M. 1998); Ramirez v. Armstrong, 673 P.2d 822, 825 (N.M. 1983); Bowen v. 
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 444 (Wis. 1994). 
 169. Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 584 (Cal. 1988); Thing v. La Chusa, 
771 P.2d 814, 829 n.10 (Cal. 1989); Garcia v. San Antonio Hous. Auth., 859 
S.W.2d 78, 81 (Tex. App. 1993). 
 170. James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109, 115 (Neb. 1985). 
 171. Kallstrom v. U.S., 43 P.3d 162, 163 (Alaska 2002). 
 172. Hislop v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 5 P.3d 
267, 269 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (In dicta, the court suggested that “something 
closely akin” to a familial relationship may also suffice.); Keck v. Jackson, 593 
P.2d 668, 670 (Ariz. 1979) (establishing Arizona’s bystander-damages law). 
 173. Biercevicz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 865 A.2d 1267, 1271–72 (Conn. 
2004) (denying bystander damages to victim’s fiancée); Batista v. Backus, No. 
CV000159533, 2000 WL 1862879, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 27, 2000) 
(denying bystander damages to victim’s friend). 
 174. Reynolds v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 611 So. 2d 1294, 1297 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (denying bystander damages to victim’s fiancée); 
Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17, 19 (Fla. 1985) (requiring close relationship 
between victim and bystander). 
 175. Smith v. Toney, 862 N.E.2d 656, 661–62 (Ind. 2007) (denying 
bystander damages to a fiancée). 
 176. Nelson v. Flanagan, 677 A.2d 545, 548 (Me. 1996) (allowing spouse’s 
claim of bystander damages). See also Michaud v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 715 
A.2d 955, 959 (Me. 1998) (barring recovery by plaintiff unrelated to the victim). 
But see Magruder v. Sawyer, No. CIV. 99-0077-B, 1999 WL 33117074, at *1 
(D. Me. Dec. 6, 1999) (denying motion to dismiss fiancé’s claim of NIED). 
 177. James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109, 115 (Neb. 1985). Though the court 
stated that aunts, uncles, and grandparents have a higher burden of proof than 
closer relatives, it left the relationship standard open to any plaintiff who can 
prove to be a victim’s close relative or spouse. 
 178. Grotts v. Zahner, 989 P.2d 415, 416 (Nev. 1999) (“Immediate family 
members of the victim qualify for standing to bring NIED claims as a matter of 
law,” whereas, “when the family relationship between the victim and the 
bystander is beyond the immediate family, the fact finder should assess the 
nature and quality of the relationship and, therefrom, determine as a factual 
matter whether the relationship is close enough to confer standing.”). 
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Virginia179 additionally limit recovery to spouses or relatives but 
do not require a specific degree of consanguinity for recovery. 
c. Close but Unrelated Parties 
Some states allow even unrelated parties to recover bystander 
damages.180 Hawaii courts adopt a more liberal construction of 
bystander damages, holding that the absence of a blood 
relationship between a victim and bystander does not foreclose 
recovery.181 Rejecting formalism, Connecticut, New Hampshire, 
and New Jersey allow a fiancé who cohabitates with the victim to 
sue for NIED.182 Additionally, Massachusetts acknowledges that a 
party who is unrelated to the victim may nevertheless be eligible to 
recover bystander damages, emphasizing that only a “familial or 
other relationship” is required.183 Finally, Tennessee does not 
require any relationship between the plaintiff and victim and 
instead considers the nature of the relationship as part of the 
calculation of damages.184 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 179. Heldreth v. Marrs, 425 S.E.2d 157, 162–63 (W. Va. 1992). 
 180. Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 766 (Haw. 1974) (allowing plaintiff 
to prove nature of relationship with victim); Yovino v. Big Bubba’s BBQ, LLC, 
896 A.2d 161, 165–67 (Conn. 2006); Graves v. Estabrook, 818 A.2d 1255, 1262 
(N.H. 2003) (allowing recovery by victim’s fiancée who had lived with him for 
seven years). But see St. Onge v. MacDonald, 917 A.2d 233, 235 (N.H. 2007) 
(denying recovery by victim’s boyfriend of six months when the couple had 
made no commitments to marry or cohabitate); Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 
372, 380 (N.J. 1994). 
 181. Leong, 520 P.2d 758, 766 (allowing plaintiff to prove nature of 
relationship with victim). 
 182. Yovino, 896 A.2d at 165–67; Graves, 818 A.2d at 1260–62. But see St. 
Onge, 917 A.2d at 235; Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 380; Thurmon v. Sellers, 62 
S.W.3d 145, 164 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 
439–40, 496 (Tenn. 1996) (allowing recovery by plaintiff who was complete 
stranger to victim). 
 183. Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (Mass. 1978) 
(emphasis added) (establishing that bystander-damage plaintiff must have “a 
close familial or other relationship” with victim to recover); Richmond v. 
Shatford, No. CA 941249, 1995 WL 1146885 (Mass. Aug. 8, 1995) (suggesting 
that a victim’s fiancé may be eligible to recover bystander damages). 
 184. Thurmon, 62 S.W.3d at 164. See also Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 437. The 
listing of states whose requirements are discussed throughout Part IV.C.1(a–c) is 
not exhaustive but is instead illustrative of the approaches followed by the 
majority of states. 
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d. Proposed Relational Requirement for Third-Party Title VII 
Claims 
By allowing a fiancé to file a Title VII retaliation claim, the 
Thompson Court adopted a broader relational requirement than 
states that require bystander-damages plaintiffs and victims to be 
second-degree blood relatives.185 Fiancés are nearly family 
members but are not yet technically related; thus, courts that allow 
fiancés’ bystander-damage claims also allow claims by both close 
and more distant relatives. Therefore, a fortiori, all classes of 
relatives, in addition to fiancés, should be able to file Title VII 
retaliation claims.186 The inclusion of this class adheres to the 
Supreme Court’s broad construction in Thompson.187 It is, 
however, imperative to balance the Court’s intent against the 
policy objective of establishing a class of plaintiffs whose claims 
employers can reasonably expect. Therefore, the adoption of 
Tennessee’s liberal approach, allowing any party to file claims and 
only considering relationship as a factor in the calculation of 
damages, would fail to satisfy this objective.188 Granting an 
unspecified “other relationship” automatic standing for third-party 
retaliation claims would likewise fall short.189 Based on the 
rationale behind underlying states’ relational requirements for 
NIED claims, and the Court’s articulated intent in Thompson, 
relatives and fiancés of the initial Title VII claimants should be 
eligible to file Title VII retaliation claims against their 
employers.190 This standard will create a sufficiently broad class of 
third-party plaintiffs that will effectively strike a balance between 
Title VII’s and employers’ competing interests.  
2. Temporal Requirement 
In addition to its relational requirement, the Dillon test requires 
that a plaintiff have contemporaneously observed the accident.191 
This constraint serves to increase the foreseeability of the 
                                                                                                             
 185. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 868 (2011). 
 186. The term relative, as used in the proposed relational requirement, should 
be read to include both blood and legal relatives, i.e., relatives through adoption 
or marriage. 
 187. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868. 
 188. Thurmon, 62 S.W.3d at 164. See also Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 437. 
 189. Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (Mass. 1978); 
Richmond v. Shatford, No. CA 941249, 1995 WL 1146885 (Mass. Aug. 8, 
1995). 
 190. See discussion supra Part IV.1(a–c); Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 863. 
 191. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920–21 (Cal. 1968). 
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plaintiff’s harm (and, thereby, future claim), as well as to decrease 
the possibility of fraudulent claims.192 These considerations also 
apply to Title VII retaliation claims, but a contemporaneous-
observation requirement would be arbitrary and useless for Title 
VII claims. First, the Title VII-protected activity forming the basis 
of the retaliation complaint might have easily been performed 
privately. Furthermore, in most cases, employees file EEOC 
complaints before employers even receive notice of them. 
Additionally, even if a retaliation plaintiff did observe his 
coworker’s participation in protected activity, the plaintiff’s 
presence or absence would not likely affect the employer’s 
decision to retaliate.  
A more relevant temporal consideration instead examines the 
time that has elapsed between the employer’s receipt of notice that 
an employee engaged in a Title VII-protected activity and the 
alleged retaliation. Common sense suggests that the probability 
that an employer acted with a retaliatory motive is greater when a 
short time passes between the two events than when more time has 
elapsed. Therefore, courts should consider the length of time 
between notice of the protected activity and the alleged retaliation 
when determining the facial validity of a third-party plaintiff’s 
Title VII retaliation claim.  
3. Spatial Requirement 
The remaining element of the Dillon test requires a plaintiff’s 
presence at the scene of the accident.193 This element is relevant to 
third-party retaliation claims, but less so than relationship and 
time. A bystander who witnesses a traumatic accident would be 
more likely affected by it if he observed it from nearby, rather than 
from a great distance. Observing a gruesome accident would 
logically be more likely to cause anguish to the bystander if he 
watches in clearer detail than if he could see only a hazy image. 
Similarly, it is more probable that an employer would act with a 
retaliatory motive against a coworker who works more closely 
with the Title VII claimant’s coworker than against an employee 
who works in a different office. Therefore, courts should note the 
proximity in which the employees work when deciding whether to 
allow a third-party plaintiff’s Title VII claim. The proximity of the 
employees, however, is not dispositive of retaliation, and should 
thus be treated as a consideration, rather than a strict requirement. 
                                                                                                             
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
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4. Standing for Third-Party Title VII Retaliation Plaintiffs 
In Thompson, the Court addressed two questions: whether 
Thompson’s retaliation claim was actionable and whether 
Thompson had standing to bring the claim.194 The standard 
proposed by this Comment addresses the Court’s second 
inquiry.195 In granting third-party plaintiffs standing for Title VII 
retaliation claims, the Court created a new class of plaintiffs, so 
this Comment seeks to set parameters for that class.196 Based on 
this proposed standard, a third-party plaintiff should have standing 
if he satisfies the relational, temporal, and spatial requirements—
that is, if (1) he is a relative or fiancé of the initial claimant; (2) the 
alleged retaliation occurred shortly after the initial protected 
activity; and (3) he worked closely with the initial claimant. These 
factors were drawn from NIED, and, while the tort principle serves 
as a useful basis for defining third-party standing for Title VII 
retaliation claimants, a significant distinction between the two 
exists.  
Whereas NIED defendants inflict injury negligently, Title VII 
retaliation defendants cause damage intentionally. Thus, while it is 
important to limit employers’ liability for Title VII retaliation 
claims to protect employers from unpredictable frivolous 
allegations, employers should not be given free rein to retaliate 
against individuals not covered by this standard. If an employer 
retaliates against an employee whom this standard excludes, that 
employee should nevertheless have the opportunity to sue if he can 
prove the facial validity of his claim. 
The purpose of the proposed standard is to instill more 
certainty for third-party Title VII retaliation claims than presently 
exists in the wake of Thompson.197 Admittedly, permitting a 
plaintiff excluded by this standard to file a Title VII retaliation 
claim based on some other justification will preserve some 
measure of uncertainty in these claims. Allowing a narrow 
exception to this standard, however, conforms to the Supreme 
Court’s expansive construction of Title VII retaliation claims 
because it will prevent employers from retaliating with impunity 
against employees excluded by the proposed standard.198 The 
policy considerations supporting the need for a precaution against 
this type of employer behavior therefore warrant the slight measure 
                                                                                                             
 194. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868. 
 195. See discussion supra Part I.C; Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868. 
 196. See discussion supra Part I.C; Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868. 
 197. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868. 
 198. See id. 
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of uncertainty inherent in this exception. This justification is 
further bolstered by the common-sense notion that an employer 
should reasonably anticipate Title VII claims from employees 
against whom it actually does retaliate. Finally, the inherent 
concern for employee protection espoused by Title VII underscores 
the need for an avenue of relief for employees who do not satisfy 
the proposed standard but who can nevertheless prove retaliation. 
Accordingly, courts should presume that third-party plaintiffs who 
fail to meet the proposed standard lack standing for Title VII 
retaliation claims unless they can present sufficient evidence of 
retaliation. Because these plaintiffs must overcome their presumed 
lack of standing, their claims will only be recognized if a court 
deems their circumstances compelling enough to merit standing. 
Allowing plaintiffs this opportunity, then, will not undermine the 
rationale underlying the proposed relational, temporal, and spatial 
requirements because it will still support the ultimate goal of 
shielding employers from unpredictable claims. 
Courts should therefore apply the standard proposed by this 
Comment as a rebuttable presumption. If a third-party plaintiff 
does not meet the stated criteria, he should be presumed to lack 
standing for a Title VII retaliation claim. He may, however, rebut 
this presumption if he can make a prima facie showing that his 
claim is valid based on any of the following factors: (1) evidence 
of employer’s knowledge of a close relationship between the 
plaintiff and the coworker who engaged in protected activity;199 (2) 
comparative evidence indicating that no reason other than 
retaliation motivated the employer’s action; (3) evidence of pretext 
for retaliation; or (4) direct evidence of retaliation. 
In “declin[ing] to identify a fixed class of relationships for 
which third-party reprisals are unlawful,” the Thompson Court 
refused to exclude plaintiffs who may have valid claims based on 
“particular circumstances.”200 Relatives and fiancés are more likely 
targets of retaliation than other individuals; however, unrelated 
coworkers may also share an extremely close relationship of which 
their employer is aware. So, a plaintiff should be able to rebut the 
presumption that he lacks standing by demonstrating his 
employer’s knowledge of a relationship similarly close to a 
familial one between the plaintiff and the initial Title VII claimant.  
Similarly, a third-party plaintiff may rebut his presumed lack of 
standing with comparative evidence indicating retaliation. 
                                                                                                             
 199. This factor refers to a close relationship other than a familial one—for 
example, an unmarried but cohabitating couple. See discussion supra Part 
III.C.1.d. 
 200. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868. 
700 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
 
 
Comparative evidence consists of similarly situated individuals 
receiving different treatment from their employers such that no 
reason other than discrimination could have caused the 
difference.201 Plaintiffs commonly use this form of evidence to 
prove allegations of employment discrimination.202 Thus, a third-
party plaintiff should be allowed to present comparative evidence 
to demonstrate that his employer’s only possible motivation for an 
adverse employment action was retaliation. 
A third-party plaintiff may additionally establish standing by 
demonstrating that his employer’s articulated reason for taking 
adverse action against him is a pretext for retaliation. Employment 
discrimination plaintiffs can recover if they prove that their 
employers’ stated motives are pretexts for discrimination.203 Third-
party plaintiffs should also have standing for Title VII retaliation 
claims if they can likewise establish that their employers’ 
justification for the alleged retaliation is, in fact, a pretext. 
Finally, a third-party plaintiff should be able to establish 
standing with direct evidence of retaliation. Direct evidence 
consists of “explicit statements or smoking gun memos”—that is, 
an employer’s explicit acknowledgement of a retaliatory motive.204 
Courts frequently allow plaintiffs to use direct evidence to prove 
allegations of employment discrimination.205 Accordingly, a third-
party plaintiff’s Title VII claim certainly should not be excluded if 
he has direct evidence, such as an email discussing a plan to fire 
him in retaliation for his coworker’s protected activity. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While the Supreme Court’s expansion of Title VII retaliation 
claims to include third-party plaintiffs in Thompson may have 
surprised some courts, the decision nevertheless conforms to its 
recent trend of increasing the types of claims that plaintiffs may 
bring under Title VII.206 In failing to propose a standard for these 
third-party retaliation claims, however, the Court unfairly exposed 
                                                                                                             
 201. William R. Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, the Rise of “Pretext Plus,” 
and the Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law 
to Employment at Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 
305, 324–25 (1996). 
 202. William R. Corbett, Fixing Employment Discrimination Law, 62 SMU 
L. REV. 81, 98 (2009). 
 203. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (discussing 
pretext analysis in discrimination case). 
 204. Corbett, supra note 201, at 323–25. 
 205. Id. at 323. 
 206. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
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employers to liability for an immeasurable number of potential 
lawsuits from an unpredictable range of plaintiffs. Employers thus 
need a standard governing third-party retaliation claims. 
Tort law principles determining which plaintiffs are eligible to 
sue for bystander damages provide a logical basis for defining 
permissible third-party retaliation plaintiffs. Following tort law 
principles of various states, a sufficiently broad group of third-
party plaintiffs becomes evident. Under this standard, then, third 
parties who should be able to sue their employers for Title VII 
retaliation claims include relatives and fiancés. When determining 
whether a third-party plaintiff may file a Title VII retaliation claim, 
courts should also consider the time that elapsed between the 
employer’s notice of the employee’s protected activity and the 
alleged retaliation. Finally, courts should consider the proximity in 
which the coworkers work.  
If a plaintiff fails to satisfy this standard, he should 
nevertheless have the ability to rebut his presumed lack of 
standing. A third-party plaintiff should then have standing if he 
demonstrates (1) evidence of employer’s knowledge of a close 
relationship between the plaintiff and the coworker who engaged 
in protected activity; (2) comparative evidence indicating that no 
reason other than retaliation motivated the employer’s action; (3) 
evidence of pretext for retaliation; or (4) direct evidence of 
retaliation. Limiting the class of third-party plaintiffs to this group 
of individuals will simultaneously fulfill the policy goals of Title 
VII and protect employers from unforeseen litigation. This will 
allow employers to implement the employment decisions 
necessary for the effective facilitation of their business operations. 
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